Overall, the audit activities involved would be subdivided into subsequent phases. 18An in-depth discussion is found in my paper: John Carlson, “Verification of DPRK Nuclear Disarmament: The Pros and Cons of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (specifically, the ROK) Participating in this Verification Program,” The Nautilus Institute, May 19, 2019, nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/verification-of-dprk-nuclear-disarmament-the-pros-and-cons-of-non-nuclear-weapon-states-specifically-the-rok-participating-in-this-verification-program/. The second major diplomatic effort was the six-party talks launched in August 2003, which were attended by China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States. Between the impasse and the crisis, these talks made critical strides in 2005, when North Korea pledged to abandon “all existing nuclear weapons and programs” and return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in 2007, when the parties agreed on a number of measures to implement the 2005 agreement. Given the potential for major litigation, it is essential that each review agreement be clearly documented. This applies to both the formal mandate of the IAEA and the description of relevant audit activities and procedures. This documentation should set out the rights and obligations of the IAEA and North Korea. Under normal circumstances, this would be done through a safeguard agreement between the IAEA and the State concerned. The 1994 freeze control provisions were supported by the 1992 Comprehensive Guarantee Agreement, which was still in force at that time. Although the agreement has not been fully implemented, it outlines the basic safeguards for which monitoring activities were partial. February 2003. The IAEA refers the matter to the Security Council. The Governing Council expressed its “deep concern” over North Korea`s action and adopted a resolution on 12 February declaring North Korea non-compliance with its nuclear protection obligations and referring the matter to the UN Security Council, as the IAEA did in these circumstances, in accordance with its status.

The Council called on North Korea to “urgently remedy” its non-compliance and to cooperate fully with the Agency. He also stressed his desire for a peaceful solution. The international expectation is that multilateral monitoring agencies, with appropriate expertise, will participate in the review of an agreement or agreement with North Korea. This means that the IAEA applies to fissile material and nuclear obligations and the role of the audit agency. Effective review is absolutely necessary to ensure the credibility and hence the sustainability of any negotiation process for the denuclearization of North Korea. The IAEA would have a key role to play in reviewing and cooperating with its audit activities and would be essential to ensure that parties to the denuclearization agreements will meet their obligations at all stages of the process. The additional protocol is important to strengthen the IAEA`s ability to identify indicators of undeclared nuclear activity. As has already been said, as long as it has nuclear weapons, North Korea will have undeclared nuclear materials and specialized facilities, including the storage of fissile material and possibly the restoration of the warhead and the clean-up of plutonium (if agreed).